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Abstract
We study hours worked by drivers in the peer-to-peer transportation sector with cross-
side network effects. Medallion lease (regulated market), commission-based (Uber-like pay)
and profit-sharing (“pure” taxi coop) compensation schemes are compared. Our static model
shows that network externalities matter, depending on the number of active drivers. When
the number of drivers is limited, in the presence of positive network effects, a regulated sys-
tem always induces more hours worked, while the commission fee influences the comparative
incentives towards effort of Uber-like pay versus profit-sharing. When the number of drivers
is infinite (or close to it), the influence of network externalities on optimal effort vanishes.
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1 Introduction
A long standing literature, as reviewed by Bloom and Van Reenen (2011), has documented that
incentive pay mechanisms positively influence worker effort. In particular, Kato and Kauhanen
(2018) found that group incentive performance related pay is more potent in boosting produc-
tivity than individual incentive pay. This literature, so far, has failed to account for cross-side
network externalities, which may cause strict concavity in the product demand with respect to
the supply of effort (when effort reflects into product quantity), thereby making the relationship
between pay and performance more difficult to assess.
The ride-sharing industry, also referred to as the peer-to-peer (P2P) transportation sector
(possibly mediated by digital platforms), where drivers provide on-demand transport to riders
using their personal vehicles, offers an interesting case for studying this issue, as it presents both
alternative compensation schemes adopted by alternative platforms (typically, taxi companies
versus ride-hailing) and non-negligible cross-side network effects (Spulber, 2019).
Loosely speaking, when the number of drivers is below a critical level, the network externality
dominates, causing marginal value to grow with quantity (e.g., due to reduced wait-times); when
the supply exceeds the critical level, the network externality is exhausted and demand has a
standard shape (i.e. negative slope). Against this background, P2P rides may be supplied under
alternative driver contracts. On the one side, traditional taxi drivers in most US cities and in
Europe must own or lease one of a limited number of medallions granting them the right to
drive. So, they keep every dollar earned, but need to pay for the medallion (in principle, also
“pure” taxi coops may be possible, with total earnings divided evenly among drivers-members,
with or without leasing). On the other side, ride-hailing platforms (like Uber) base drivers’ pay
on a proportional compensation scheme, according to which, in return for a commission fee,
drivers can set their work schedule without having to worry about covering a lease.
Empirical evidence on comparative drivers performance in the P2P transportation sector, as
measured by hours worked, is available. By using administrative data on drivers using the Uber
platform from 2012 to 2014, Hall and Krueger (2018) documented that drivers who reported
having no other job in 2014 worked more than 35 hours per week on the Uber app. Hall et
al. (2018) measured how supply of hours worked by drivers reacts to ride fares and reported
that for a 10% increase in the fare, drivers eventually work 6% more hours. Uber drivers have
been found to have higher capacity utilization (the fraction of time a driver has a fare-paying
passenger in the car while he or she is working) compared to taxi drivers (Cramer and Krueger,
2016); however, taxi drivers are shown to work slightly more hours (Berger et al., 2018). With
data from an experiment on random samples of Boston Uber drivers, Angrist et al. (2017)
found that drivers who work more hours are better off being taxi drivers, while drivers with low
hours prefer work on a ride-hailing platform with a proportional compensation scheme.
While these empirical figures tell that drivers’ effort varies with the fare and the pay scheme,
they do not allow to understand to which extent it is so under the same market entry conditions
(i.e. under a given size of the market and with utilization rates being equal between platforms)
and which are the implications of network effects.
With this paper, we shed some light on this from a theoretical point of view, which allows us
to circumvent important empirical issues, including data availability constraints (e.g., the lack
of empirical measures of cross-side externalities). We analyze comparatively the effort supplied
under three driver pay schemes or contracts: medallion lease (regulated market), commission-
based (Uber-like) and profit-sharing (“pure” taxi coop). We do so with a simple short-run
model, where both the number of drivers and capacity utilization are exogenous. As a static
exercise, moreover, we abstract away from surge dynamics.
We find that network effects may matter crucially, depending on the number of active drivers.
Precisely, the analysis presented here argues for a simple but useful result. That is, when the
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number of drivers is not infinite (or close to it), in the presence of positive network effects,
a regulated system always induces more hours worked, while a Uber-like fee influences the
comparative incentives towards effort of commission-based pay versus profit-sharing, with the
fee having to be sufficiently low for Uber to provide more hours worked than a “pure” taxi coop.
When the number of drivers is very high, the influence of network externalities on optimal effort
tends to disappear, and a pay scheme based on medallion lease continues to induce more hours
worked than both a Uber-like platform and “pure” taxi coops. Some intuitions for explaining
these results are provided.
The model offers insights to regulators seeking to improve coverage by P2P transportation
services, thereby reducing wait-times.
2 Hours worked under alternative pay schemes
We model the P2P transportation sector as a two-sided market with cross-side network effects.
In the short-run, there is a given finite number of active drivers L > 1. Denote with
∑L
i=1 hi = H
the total amount of hours worked, with hi being the hours worked for driver i. Too keep notation
simple, denote the average hours worked with h, i.e. H/L = h, and assume that in the short-run
the utilization rate is fixed. To simplify, we assume full capacity utilization.1 Due to the cross-
side externality, the average time h ∈ [0, hmax], with hmaxi = hmax ∀i, spent by drivers while
driving (i.e. the amount of service supplied) increases the utility of riders and thereby their
willingness to pay for a ride until a critical threshold in supply is reached; above the threshold,
the marginal value for riders is decreasing and so is their willingness to pay. The inverse demand
function for hours of service therefore is
p(h) = αh1/2 − βh (1)
The turning point is h ≡ (α/2β)−1/2 < hmax.2 Notice that (1) is strictly concave.3 If h < h,
network effects are positive; if h > h, more hours worked generate negative externalities. With
L being fixed, for any level of hours worked, supply is always met by available demand, with
p(h) being the corresponding willingness to pay. Suppose L is fixed by a regulator such that,
when all the drivers work hmax hours, demand is just exhausted. The typical demand function
for ride-sharing is represented in Figure (1).
[insert Figure (1) about here]
The driver’s problem is
max
hi
Ui = f(p(h), hi)− ci(hi) (2)
where f(·) is a function increasing in both price and effort and where ci(hi) is a continuous and
twice differentiable function for the cost of effort (with ci(hi)
′ > 0 and ci(hi)′′ > 0). We omit
fixed costs (e.g. the fixed cost of the car) from (2) for simplicity, as they are irrelevent for the
propositions here.
Next, we consider three alternative platforms or driver pay schemes.
Medallion lease (regulated market). With a medallion system, drivers must own or lease a
medallion granting them the right to drive. Assume that the number of available medallions is
1This is not a critical assumption here.
2The upper limit hmax can be thought of as due to drivers’ physical constraints or to a regulatory cap.
3The functional form we assume for the inverse demand function is not crucial for our argument; it is sufficient
that p((1− a)h1 + ah2) > (1− a)p(h) + ap(h) for any a ∈ (0, 1) and h1, h2 ∈ [0, hmax], with h1 6= h2.
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M = L, with mi being the price of one medallion for driver i (with mi = mj ∀i 6= j). Then,
the driver’s utility is
Umi = p(hi, hL−1)hi − ci(hi)−mi (3)
where the notation p(hi, hL−1) (with hL−1 =
∑L−1
j=1 hj/L − 1, j 6= i) is functional to make hi
explicit as an argument of p(·). By substituting Umi in problem (2), we obtain the following
FOC:
p(hi, hL−1) + p′(hi, hL−1)hi = c′i(hi) (4)
whose corresponding optimal level of effort is hmi .
Commission-based (Uber-like pay). Under a commission-based pay, drivers are paid the fare
less a percentage retained by Uber. The driver’s utility is
U ei = (1− ϕ)p(hi, hL−1)hi − ci(hi) (5)
where ϕ ∈ (0, 1] is the proportional commission fee to be paid to Uber. After substituing U ei in
problem (2), we obtain the following FOC:
(1− ϕ)p(hi, hL−1) + (1− ϕ)p′(hi, hL−1)hi = c′i(hi) (6)
whose corresponding optimal level of effort is hei .
Profit-sharing (“pure” taxi coop). With profit-sharing, total earnings are divided evenly
between drivers (in this case, we ignore possible medallion leasing). Here, the driver’s utility is
Uwi =
p(hi, hL−1)hi + p(hi, hL−1)hL−1(L− 1)
L
− ci(hi) (7)
Again, after substituing Uwi in problem (2), we obtain the FOC
p(hi, hL−1) + p′(hi, hL−1)hi + p′(hi, hL−1)hL−1(L− 1)
L
= c′i(hi) (8)
whose corresponding optimal level of effort is hwi .
Proposition 1. In the presence of positive network externalities (namely, h ≤ h), average hours
worked are always higher under a medallion system compared to Uber-like pay; when h > h,
hmi > h
e
i iff |p(hi, hL−1)| > |p′(hi, hL−1)hi|. The fee used in the commission-based pay does not
matter. Moreover, the medallion system always induces more hours worked than profit-sharing,
regardless of network effects.
Proof. See Appendix A.1. 
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is simple. By comparing (4) and (6) and manipulating,
it is easy to see that hmi > h
e
i when p(hi, hL−1) + p
′(hi, hL−1)hi > 0, i.e. when MR > 0
(with MR denoting the marginal revenue). Since, under a medallion system, drivers enjoy
full revenue extraction, whilst they are required to pay some proportional commission fee on
revenues under a Uber-like pay, the latter will be superior only when MR < 0. Related to
Proposition 1, in particular, MR is always positive in the upward sloping section of the demand
curve (i.e., with positive network externalities). When the demand curve is downward sloping,
then MR can be either positive or negative; in this case, therefore, the additional condition
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|p(hi, hL−1)| > |p′(hi, hL−1)hi| (which implies MR > 0) needs to be imposed for hmi > hei to
hold.
Also, by comparing Equation (6) and Equation (8), we obtain that hei < h
w
i iff
ϕ > 1− 1
L
[
1 + (L− 1) p
′(hi, hL−1)hi
p(hi, hL−1) + p′(hi, hL−1)hi
]
≡ ϕ (9)
Two additional propositions follow.
Proposition 2. In the presence of positive network externalities (namely, h ≤ h), ϕ is always
lower than 1, i.e. it always exists a value of ϕ in the interval (0, 1) above which profit-sharing
induces more hours worked compared to Uber-like pay.
Proof. See Appendix A.2. 
Proposition 3. When positive network externalities are absent (namely, h > h), it exists a
value h∗ ∈ (h, hmax) such that ϕ = 1 for any h ≥ h∗; i.e., when the average of hours worked is
sufficiently high, Uber-like pay always induces more hours worked compared to profit-sharing.
Proof. See Appendix A.3. 
The joint message of the three propositions can be summarized as follows. In the presence
of positive network effects, the medallion system always induces more hours worked, while the
commission fee influences the comparative incentives towards effort of Uber-like pay versus
profit-sharing, with the fee having to be sufficiently low for Uber-like pay to provide more hours
worked than profit-sharing. This holds critically under the assumption of having the same
number of drivers under the three pay schemes, with L = M (in the short-run, we do not allow
for free entry of drivers).
The intuition for explaining why the commission fee matters for hei < h
w
i to hold is that,
under both Uber-like pay and profit-sharing, drivers do not fully enjoy individually raised rev-
enues, with “pure” taxi coop drivers partly compensating the loss by capturing a share of the
revenues raised by the other members of the team. When the average number of hours worked
is sufficiently high (i.e., MR is relatively low) the compensation mechanism provided by profit-
sharing has a lower power, thus Uber-like pay can be shown to be superior even with a higher
commission fee. Phrased differently, profit-sharing works better than Uber-like pay in terms of
effort when marginal revenues are higher. Figure (2) shows the pattern of ϕ along the range of
hours worked.
[insert Figure (2) about here]
3 Optimal effort when the market is very large
Suppose that the number of active drivers L is very high or infinite. Assume that the number of
riders is proportionally high, so that they continue to be concerned with h (i.e. average hours
worked) and the demand curve again can be described by (1). Alternatively, the number of
riders is very high and L is increased proportionally by a regulator. In this case, variation in
the hours worked by driver i has no effect on prices, i.e. the first derivative of p(·) with respect
to hi is 0. Now, manipulating from (4), (6) and (8), optimal effort under alternative platforms
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needs to satisfy respectively:
Medallion lease: p(h) = c′i(hi)⇒ hMi (10)
Commission-based : (1− ϕ)p(h) = c′i(hi)⇒ hEi (11)
Profit-sharing : p(h)/L = c′i(hi)⇒ hWi (12)
Proposition 4. When the number of active drivers is very high or infinite, network effects do
not influence optimal effort, under any pay contract. Moreover, a pay scheme based on medallion
lease always provides higher hours worked than Uber-like pay and profit-sharing; Uber-like pay
induces higher effort than profit-sharing iff ϕ < (L− 1)/L ∼ 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.4. 
As one might intuit, the hMi equilibrium has some attractive welfare properties, as it corre-
sponds to maximization of total surplus. In all the other instances, the number of hours worked
will deviate from the socially optimal level. The reason is simple. When the number of drivers
is very high, the market of rides is perfectly competitive and drivers are price-takers. So, both
the Uber-like fee and the profit-sharing can be thought of as a tax on output influencing optimal
supply decisions.
Clearly, the model is compatible with a market where more platforms are active at the same
moment. In this case, the level of h will be a weighted average of the hours worked by drivers
under the different work arrangements.
Finally, from (10), (11) and (12), it is easy to see that hours worked are higher in a small
market with respect to very large markets when network effects are positive (i.e. h < h), under
any pay scheme. When h > h and therefore p′(hi, hL−1) < 0, the opposite holds: hMi > h
m
i ,
hEi > h
e
i and h
W
i > h
w
i .
4 Conclusions
Our analysis suggests that the driver pay scheme has implications for riders’ welfare through
two main mechanisms. The first mechanism is “pecuniary externalities”: more hours worked
influence the price for a ride, with this effect being positive or negative depending on whether
the change in hours worked occurs below or above the turning point of the demand curve (i.e.
positive network effects are present or not). The second mechanism is “quality externalities”:
since the hours worked positively correlate with lower wait-times for riders, a pay scheme in-
duces longer or shorter wait-times depending on network effects and, for a Uber-like pay, the
commission fee. The shorter wait-times for Uber riders compared to riders of traditional taxi
companies documented for many US cities can be reconciled with our model also by noticing
that the number of Uber drivers tends to be much larger than taxi drivers in local markets
(Cramer and Krueger, 2016; Angrist et al., 2017).
With non-crucial changes of the model, the comparative results presented here can be gener-
alized to other types of quality improving effort and to other markets where network externalities
are non-negligible. Extensions of this model in a dynamic context may possibly include risk
bearing and platform competition.
6
Appendix
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
As for the first part of Proposition 1, by comparing (4) and (6) and manipulating, it is straight-
forward to observe that, for any ϕ > 0, hmi > h
e
i when p(hi, hL−1) + p
′(hi, hL−1)hi > 0. This
is verified for any p′(hi, hL−1) > 0 and when |p(hi, hL−1)| > |p′(hi, hL−1)hi|. As for the sec-
ond part of Proposition 1, we need to compare (4) and (8). We obtain that hmi > h
w
i when
p(hi, hL−1) + p′(hi, hL−1)hi > p(hi, hL−1)/L+ p′(hi, hL−1)hi, with hi = h. This always holds if
L > 1.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2
Manipulating (9), ϕ can be expressed as 1−(1/L)−δ+(δ/L), with δ = [p′(h)hi]/[p(h)+p′(h)hi].
When h < h, p′(h) > 0. Thus, we have that 0 < δ < 1. This implies that 1−(1/L)−δ+(δ/L) <
1.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 3
Denote again [p′(h)hi]/[p(h) + p′(h)hi] with δ. Then, from ϕ = 1− (1/L)− δ + (δ/L) it results
that ϕ = 1 when δ is lower than 0 and precisely equal to 1/(1−L). δ < 0 when p′(h) < 0, that
is when h > h.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 4
As for the first part of Proposition 4, it is sufficient to notice that (10), (11) and (12) do not
include p′(h). As for the second part of Proposition 4, we need to compare (10), (11) and
(12). With ϕ > 0, hMi > h
E
i . Moreover, h
E
i > h
W
i when (1 − ϕ)p(h) > p(h)/L, i.e. when
ϕ < (L− 1)/L, with limL→∞(L− 1)/L = 1.
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Figure 1: Demand function for hours of service in the P2P transportation sector.
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Figure 2: Fee threshold for Uber-like pay inducing more hours worked than profit-sharing.
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